PSA2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

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Causal Judgment (Sponsored by the Society for Philosophy and Psychology)

Thursday, 3 November 2016
10:45 - 12:15

Piedmont 1 (12th Floor)

Chair: Christopher Hitchcock, Caltech

Causal judgment plays a central role in human cognition. Recent work in cognitive science attempts to determine more precisely what kinds of processes and representations are implicated in causal judgment. The papers in this proposal represent a variety of different ways of approaching this issue. With the advance of counterfactual and interventionist theories of causation, there has been a flowering of work on the extent to which ordinary people make judgments that conform to those theories. Ordinary causal judgments permeate both higher cognition and immediate processing. People have low-level perception of causation, e.g., in visual displays of objects being launched by contact. People also deploy causal reasoning in high level cognition, for prediction, explanation, moral judgment. Developmental psychologists, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have all been working on this issue.


The Selection of Path-Specific Effects
Christopher Hitchcock, California Institute of Technology,
Explaining the Impact of Normality on Causal Intuitions: The Role of Sampling Propensities
Thomas Icard, Stanford University,
Jonathan Kominsky, Yale University,
Joshua Knobe, Yale University,
The moral dimension of implicit verb causality
Laura Niemi, Harvard University,
Joshua Hartshorne, Boston University,
Tobias Gerstenberg, MIT,
Liane Young, Boston University,
What Causal illusions Might Tell us about the Perception of Causation
Phillip Wolff, Emory University,
Robert Thorstad

 

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