PSA2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

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Doubt for Dawid’s Non-Empirical Theory Assessment

Dawid’s account of non-empirical theory assessment is meant to compliment traditional theory assessments. I argue that his arguments don’t provide support for this account. His three arguments, the no alternatives argument, the unexpected explanatory connections argument, and the meta-inductive argument from prior theories’ success, are problematic. In particular, I argue that the meta-inductive argument provides the same sort of restriction that is already assumed in Dawid’s adoption of scientific underdetermination, so it doesn’t provide support for Dawid’s claims. The arguments are interdependent, so showing that one fails is sufficient to cast doubt on Dawid’s entire account

Author Information:

Cristin Chall    
Philosophy
University of South Carolina

 

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