PSA2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

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Pragmatism and Objectivity in Subjective Bayesianism

We present a novel angle on Bruno de Finetti's subjective Bayesianism, viewed entirely through the lens of his Pragmatism. Charles Sanders Peirce's verification theory of meaning can be seen to motivate most of de Finetti's philosophical programme. We contribute to the ongoing debate on the more controversial aspects of his subjectivism, and draw attention to the overriding need for objectivity which motivates the work of de Finetti. This last point has the special aim of complementing, and in some aspects contrasting, the views that depict de Finetti's subjectivism as an "anything goes" theory of rationality.

Author Information:

Colin Elliot    
Department of Philosophy
Univeristy of Tilburg


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