PSA2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

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Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism

Accuracy-based arguments for conditionalization and probabilism appear to have a significant advantage over their Dutch Book rivals. They rely only on the plausible epistemic norm that one should try to decrease the inaccuracy of one'’s beliefs. Furthermore, it seems that
conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide range of measures of inaccuracy. However, we argue that among the measures in the literature, there are some from which one can prove conditionalization, others from which one can prove probabilism, and none from which one can prove both. Hence at present, the accuracy-based approach cannot underwrite both conditionalization and probabilism.

Author Information:

Peter Lewis    
University of Miami

Don Fallis    
University of Arizona


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