PSA2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

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In Defense of the Actual Metaphysics of Race

In a recent paper, David Ludwig (2015, 244) argues that “the new metaphysics of race” is “based on a confusion of metaphysical and normative classificatory issues.” Ludwig defends his thesis by arguing that the new metaphysics of race is non-substantive according to three notions of non-substantive metaphysics from contemporary metametaphysics. However, I show that Ludwig’s argument is an irrelevant critique of actual metaphysics of race. One interesting result is that actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the metaphysics done in philosophy of science than mainstream analytic metaphysics.

Author Information:

Quayshawn Spencer    
Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania

 

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