PSA2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

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Mind-Dependent Kinds

Many contemporary philosophers include mind-independence in their criteria for realism about natural kinds. But there are many kinds, even in the domain of the natural sciences, that are not strictly mind-independent, towards which we might not want to adopt a non-realist stance. In light of the prevalence of such kinds, is there a way upholding the centrality of mind-independence to realism? I will argue that the principal strategies for doing so, such as distinguishing causal from constitutive mind-dependence, are not successful and will try to show that mind-independence is irrelevant to realism about kinds.

Author Information:

Muhammad Ali Khalidi    
Philosophy
York University

 

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