PSA2016: The 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

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A reductive physicalist account of the autonomy of psychology

In a type-identity reductive-physicalist account of the special sciences, the special sciences kinds cannot be multiply realized by physical kinds. In this talk I shall present a new type-identity approach, based on developments in the foundations of statistical mechanics (see Hemmo and Shenker 2012, 2016). This new type-identity framework enables one to have the cake and eat it too: to endorse type identity reductive physicalism, and yet explain: the (misleading) appearance of multiple realization in the special sciences including psychology; the possibility of genuine anomaly of the mental; and the genuine autonomy of all the special sciences.

Author Information:

Orly Shenker    
Multiple Realizability in a Physical World
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem


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